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Abstrak 
 
Federasi Rusia merupakan aktor global yang menerapkan kebijakan tegas terhadap Ukraina. Guna mencapai tujuan 
politik nasional Rusia yang dikendalikan dari Moskwa, melalui operasi militer di tahun 2014, didefinisikan 
bagaimana negara tersebut berperilaku. Melalui kombinasi operasi militer dan non-militer, Rusia secara perlahan 
memperoleh kekuasaan melalui aneksasi Krimea. Efektivitas metoda ini dipergunakan untuk menentukan strategi 
perang Rusia saat ini. Dengan demikian menjelaskan bagaimana kebijakan luar negeri dan kebijakan pertahanan 
Rusia dari tahun 2000 hingga 2013 yang memiliki ketergantungan pada lingkungan strategis Ukraina terhadap Rusia, 
dan kepentingan nasional Rusia pada Ukraina. Fokus utama penelitian ini adalah pencapaian tujuan politik Rusia 
dalam operasi militer yang dilaksanakan di Ukraina dan menganalisa komponen keamanan nasional Rusia yang 
signifikan mempengaruhi interaksi konflik asimetrik. 
 
Kata-kata kunci: keamanan nasional, tujuan politik, operasi militer, perilaku negara  Abstract 
 
Russia Federation as global actor applied its policies towards Ukraine remains assertive. In pursuing state’s political 
objectives from Moscow, the escalation of military operation in 2014 defined as the way on how the state behaves. By 
means of the combination of military and non-military measures on the conduct of operation, Russia is now slowly 
regaining its power through the annexation of Crimea. The effectiveness of this method determines to be Russia’s 
strategy on contemporary warfare. Thus, it explains how Russian foreign and defense policy from 2000 to 2013 that 
depend on surrounding strategic environment of Ukraine to Russia, and the national interests of Russia to Ukraine. 
The main focus of this research is on the achievement of Russia’s political objective in its military operation in 
Ukraine and analysis on Russia’s national security components that are significantly influence the interaction of this 
asymmetric conflict. 
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Introduction 
Major states often exercise their 
military operation as the strategy to pursuit 
their objectives. The acts systematically 
identified as the behavior of states during war 
time. The outcome of such action encourages 
the international system to formulate an 
institution that could maintain the world order, 
where it known as the United Nations (UN). In 
January 1946, the four major states (Britain, 
France, Russia, and the United States) who 
were often exercising military operation met 
for the first time as the permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council. Despite 
as the immediate effects from World War II, 
these states power have tendency to implies 
victory in war, they need to maintain their 
existence in the international system 
cooperatively and competitively. Although the 
promotion of the ideas of the UN has been 
introduce, the military activities are still 
continuously conducted by those major states 
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in the next decades. Their ability in the 
conduct of military operations are adequate 
quantity in achieving the objectives(Volt, 
2001). Thus, the operations often found as 
strategic tools of a state in pursing their 
interests because it remains as the capability of 
states‟ power in pursuing its objectives on 
certain condition. 
The world‟s atmosphere was 
dramatically changed when the two great 
powers, between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) and the United States (U.S.) 
came into competition in the second half of the 
20th century, known as the Cold War. During 
this period, the establishment of mutual 
assistance was prominent in international 
security architecture. The willingness of states 
to be a dominant actor in the international 
system is also important. As the result, one of 
the major states (the Soviet Union) during this 
period established a security alliance known as 
the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact was a 
formed of political and military alliance under 
Soviet Union direction in affirming its control 
over military forces in the region as well as to 
counterbalance to North AtlantiTreaty 
Organization (NATO) on the European 
contingent (Curtis, 1992). After inking the 
treaty, with the support of Soviet foreign 
policy, Brezhnev Doctrine – “Doctrine of 
Limited Sovereignty”, declared that when 
forces that are hostile to socialism try to revert 
the development of some socialist country 
towards the restoration of the capitalist order, 
it becomes not only a problem of the country 
concerned, but also a common problem and 
concern of all socialist countries (Brezhnev, 
1968). Under this security paradigm, as a 
strong actor (the Soviet Union) often did 
military operations towards weak actors (post-
Soviet space) in order to keep their influence 
towards the opposing state. As such, the 
strategic interaction is classified as the study of 
asymmetric conflict in international relations 
where the strong actor should almost always 
win in every conflict based on its victory (Toft, 
no year) 
The security structure of the Soviet 
Union as major state slowly changes. After 
expel of Albania in 1962, the organizational 
structure of this alliance had been modified. 
The reunification of Germany in 1990, the rise 
of non-communist government, such as Poland 
and Czechoslovakia in 1990 and 1991, 
confirmed the demise of the Warsaw Pact and 
marked the end of the Cold War as well. 
Hence, with the emergence of independence 
states of former Soviet Union, it has shown the 
decline of state capability to control. At the 
moment of Soviet state dissolution, Russia 
consistently preserving its national security 
and showing its capability as a major state 
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throughout various formulation of her 
domestic and foreign policies. 
After the dismissal of the Soviet Union 
in 1990, the relations between Russia and 
former Soviet states remain unstable. Russia 
keeps maintaining its dominant within these 
countries through various economic, political, 
and even military activities until today. Along 
with her foreign policy priority, the aims to 
establish a Eurasian integration along with 
(Commonwealth of Independence States) CIS 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013), space has 
restore Russia to has a proactive approach 
towards these countries. The basis of Russia 
priority in the region is not only base on 
sharing generic historical background, but to 
build regional integration in various spheres 
along with the CIS Member States through 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2013). 
The concept of foreign policy of the 
Russian Federation, especially on paragraph 48
(e), it stated that: build up relations with 
Ukraine as a priority partner within the CIS, 
contribute to its participation in extended 
integration processes (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2013). The importance of Ukraine on 
Russia‟s border is undeniable. The 
aforementioned situation is in line with a 
statement from Henry Kissinger statement in 
an open editorial in the Washington Post that 
“To Russia, Ukraine can never be just a 
foreign country” (Kissinger, 2014). Therefore, 
the conflict occurring between Russia and 
Ukraine within Ukraine‟s territory in 2014 is 
reflecting the importance of Ukraine for Russia 
domination in the region. Based on Russia‟s 
movement towards the country, it illustrated a 
new generation of war from Russia‟s approach 
today. This pattern of interactions has 
demonstrated the concept of asymmetric 
warfare which has been exist long time ago. 
For instance, as the sage of warfare theory, 
Tsun Tzu, on his work The Art of War 
determined that all warfare is based on 
deception. When confronted with an enemy 
one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; 
feign disorder and strike him. When he 
concentrates, prepare against him; where he is 
strong, avoid him (Griffith, 1971: 66-67). It 
identified tactical strategy in facing the 
adversaries‟ strength and advocates it into 
indirect approach.  
Russia respects the universal standards 
of human rights and democracy as main 
principles that must be non-violently 
interpreted by means of different cultural 
traditions, which is the case in the Western 
democracies which used traditions and cultural 
heritages in order to develop domestically 
sustainable interpretations of international 
agreements and diplomatic relations. 
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It creates dilemmatic relations between Russia 
and the broader West which strained on 
numerous occasions since the collapse of the 
USSR. Yet fears of a new Cold War have been 
given added impetus have come to perceive as 
a game-changing event. It refers to Russia‟s 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, 
and its subsequent thinly disguised assistance 
for separatists in the industrialized Donbas 
region of Eastern Ukraine. Whereas previous 
points of tension between Russia and the West 
have given rise to predictions of renewed 
rivalry, none of them prior to the crisis in 
Ukraine had resulted in the actual 
aggrandizement of territory by the Russian 
Federation. This was true of Kosovo in 1999, 
the two wars in Chechnya, and the brief war 
with Georgia over South Ossetia in 2008 
(Sussex and Kaneth, 2013: 2). 
Indeed Russia expands its territory 
since 2014 to 2015.  The conflict in Ukraine 
had significant repercussions for regional 
order, especially in terms of institutional 
arrangements, the politics of energy and 
resources, as well as great power competition 
Russia Geopolitics in Ukraine 
The loss of Ukraine in 1991 has also 
ultimately marked the decline of Russia 
control over this state. With the changing of 
security structure after the Cold War, it adjusts 
both states interaction. The political instability 
in Ukraine on the year of 2014 has sent a 
significant challenge for Russia‟s national 
security, especially towards Crimea as its naval 
base. That matter has jeopardized Russia vital 
interest near Black Sea, so it influences the 
formulation of strategy towards Ukraine, 
where Russia needs to use its military 
operation for its interest‟s protection. As a 
major state, Russia needs to maintain national 
security from possible external hazards to 
maintain its control over Ukraine.  
It highlights analysis of the current 
Russian political discourse monitored by 
Moscow which focuses on one aspect of its 
normative dimension, namely the ideal of 
national sovereignty and anti-colonial 
resistance. Kremlin decision makers‟ 
resistance can be shaped and is actually shaped 
in many different ways. As any other vision of 
liberation, it is used both by the oppressed and 
the oppressors.  
Russia is much concerned by the 
developments of the United States and the 
European Union Foreign Policies that seem to 
believe that they have the right to interfere in 
other states‟ internal affairs. Lavrov also 
indicated that this self-proclaimed right is 
often justified by the Western leaders in terms 
of political and ideological superiority of the 
West. Lavrov stressed that the Russian 
position, for example in relation to the so 
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called “Arab spring”, is based on the 
fundamental Principles of International Law 
depends on national sovereignty and non-
interference. Commenting on the situation in 
Syria during the spring 2013, Lavrov further 
confirms that in most of the cases military 
solutions “could only mean radicalization of 
the country” (Glasser, 2013).  
It is easy to demonstrate how Lavrov‟s 
view on international politics presented in the 
interview fits very well into the tradition of 
just war ethics as well as it includes an 
articulated normative vision of how the 
international system of human rights should be 
sustained (Glasser, 2013). The Russian concept 
of foreign policy points out some additional 
normative concerns in promoting Russia‟s 
approach to Human Rights issues transparently 
and pragmatic. It leads to Russia global 
competition on a civilizational level, whereby 
various values and models of development 
based on the universal principles of democracy 
and market economy start to clash and 
compete against each other in Eastern Europe.  
Therefore, with the condition as an 
independence state, during Yanukovych 
presidency (2010-2014), several tensions have 
taken place in the relations between Moscow 
and Kyiv. One of the cases is where Kyiv has 
built a close relationship with European Union 
(EU). The Ukraine and EU work on an 
association agreement-aiming at political 
association which adhering European values 
and principles and economic integration for 
last few years. It is challenging the national 
security of Russia as a major state in the 
region. As the result, before it was due to 
signed, Yanukovych rejected the agreement on 
November 2013. After several identification 
conducted, one of the reason behind this 
agenda is that Russia successfully 
implemented its political and economic 
leverage over Ukraine in order to cancel its 
agreement with EU. There has been an 
economic instability between Kyiv and 
Moscow trade relations. Russia has putted a 
sanction over Ukraine in mid-August. Cutting 
energy supply to Ukraine and blocking the 
flow of imports from the country have 
affecting the economic condition of Ukraine. 
In accordance to the Wall Street Journal, 
“Ukrainian officials say the Russian sanctions 
cost them US$15 billion in lost trade and it 
could run up to half a trillion by signing the 
EU deal” (The Wall Street Journal, 2013). As 
the result of rejection of agreement, it caused 
big street protests from pro-Western protesters 
in Kyiv‟s Independence Square continuously. 
On 22 February 2014, a peak demonstration 
occurred when protesters took control over 
government building in Kyiv. This situation 
resulted in Yanukovych fled from Kyiv to 
eastern part city of Ukraine, Kharkiv, in asking 
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for support (The Wall Street Journal, 2013). 
The security instability in Ukraine, on 
February 27, 2014, a penetration over Crimea 
was executed in the capital of Simferopol, with 
approximate number of 120 armed Russian 
insurgents armed with automatic weapons 
seized the Crimean parliament (Ukrainian 
Policy, 2014). The signification of occupation 
then marked with Russian flag flies over 
Crimea‟s parliament (The Wall Street Journal, 
2013). This condition has put a high tension on 
the violation of Ukraine territory in regards to 
Russian invasion which absolutely occurring. 
Moreover, it was also followed by a statement 
from the Ukrainian Acting President, 
Turchynov stated that: 
“Russia has begun wanton aggression 
against Ukraine under the guise of training 
exercise. The Russian Federation has sent 
troops into Crimea, and has not only 
captured the Crimean parliament and 
Council of Ministers, but also has taken 
control of communication facilities [...] 
We‟re sure that Ukraine will preserve its 
territory, Ukraine will defend its 
independence and any attempts of 
annexation or intrusion will have very 
serious consequences” (Ukrainian 
Policy, 2014). 
On May 2014, a new president of 
Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko is being elected 
where at the same time the conflict occurred is 
still continuously. This president known has 
long supported the country‟s pro-European 
movement (BBC News, 2014). Due to this 
political challenge, Russia once again is 
exercising its military operation into Crimea in 
order to protect the Black Sea Fleet on the 
ground (Ukrainian Policy, 2014). Therefore, as 
the strategic interest of Russia, such military 
operations are conducted in Crimea. This 
operation has established a strategic interaction 
between Russia and Ukraine in achieving their 
political objectives. The interaction is being 
identified as the asymmetric warfare between 
strong actor (Russia) and weak actor (Ukraine) 
in winning their survival. 
A strategic interaction between the two 
countries in Ukraine is reflecting on how a 
strong state (Russia) is trying to defeat a weak 
state (Ukraine) through military operations 
which conducted periodically. It is in line with 
how Carl von Clausewitz understanding the 
fact about warfare that it must waged the 
political objective: 
“We see, therefore, that war is not merely 
an act of policy but a true political 
instrument, a continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on with other means. 
War in general, and the commander in any 
specific instance, is entitled to require that 
the trend and designs of policy shall not be 
inconsistent with these means. That, of 
course is no small demand, but however 
much it will affect political aims in a given 
case, it will never do more than modify 
them. The political object is the goal, war 
is the means of reaching it, and means can 
never be considered in isolation from their 
purpose” (Clausewitz, 1827).  
The Cold War remains echoing in the 
case of Ukraine as a formerly part of Soviet 
Union. In order to protect its national security 
and achieving the political objective, Russia 
implies its victory as a strong actor by 
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conducting military operations in Ukraine. As 
the response, Ukraine is also conducting 
several operations and tactics based to 
overcome the challenge. Therefore, the relative 
power occurred within this pattern is 
explaining the logic of the asymmetric war 
between Russia and Ukraine. With various 
operations and tactics executed from both 
sides, the relative power owned will later 
explains the relative interests of the state on 
how they should response. As such, the 
strategic interactions that happened during 
conflict could determine the outcome of 
relative power. 
Russia Strategy in Regional Security 
Russia has reinvented its national 
policy, which is all about economic 
cooperation and joint energy projects rather 
than territorial disputes. Even further afield, 
Vietnam has shown an increasing interest in 
Russia, expressing its enthusiasm for being 
involved with Russia‟s recently launched 
Eurasian Union in Asia Pacific economic 
integration. 
Despite the legacy of Soviet might, the 
degree of trust towards Russia in the Asia 
Pacific is symbolically revealed in the reaction 
to Russia‟s modernization of its Pacific Fleet. 
Whereas China‟s re-fitting of an ancient 
aircraft carrier caused a flurry of intensely 
negative coverage, there has been little fuss or 
outcry in this region about the procuring of 
two state of the art Mistral assault ships which 
will enter service in 2014 (Manurung, 2013). 
Even though this perception of  Russia 
in the region as non-threatening could be a 
great opportunity for the Russian leadership in 
Kremlin, to stabilize the region there is a vital 
need for a forum whereby geopolitics can be 
discussed in the same way in which economics 
and globalization are discussed at the annual 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summits. However, Russia has long experience 
in great power politics and the complex 
security arrangements of the Cold War and its 
continuing legacy. It provides Russia with the 
necessary prerequisites to promote and help 
implement innovative proposals for a multi-
lateral security dialogue across the region. 
The writer used realism approach of 
International Relations theory define power 
implies victory in each interaction during the 
conflict. The writer sees the military operations 
in Crimean conflict as the strategic interaction 
of strong actor to defeat weak actor to increase 
their relative power. Also bring strategic 
interaction theory in this case to identify the 
ideal-types of strategies taken by states in 
pursuing their national interest. This strategy 
will distinct the approaches direct and indirect 
actors in implementing their operations and 
tactics on terrain which beneficial for the 
Jurnal INSIGNIA │Vol 4, No 2, November 2017 
Russia Domination Policy:  Implementation of Military Operation in Ukraine  
(2014 – 2015) 
28  28 
 
position. It establishes theories which apply in 
the framework, determining the level of 
analysis is very essential in this research as 
analytical tools. In international conflict, 
according to Waltz (1959), there are three 
levels of analysis: individual level, state level, 
and state system level. In association with this 
research, the writer uses the state system 
analysis in explaining the strategic interaction 
between Russia and Ukraine. This is to 
accommodate the Realist approach reflecting 
the actions taken due to the clash of interests 
among states in protecting their national 
security. 
The strategic interaction theory 
explains why some asymmetric conflict could 
end quickly and how weak actors can 
asymmetric war over strong actors. In this 
theory, strategy refers to an actor‟s plan for 
using armed forces to achieve military or 
political objectives (Marsheimer, 1983: 28-29). 
Within this definition, the term strategy should 
be differentiated into two affiliated terms: 
grand strategy and tactics. Grand strategy is 
defined as the consolidation of diplomatic, 
economic, military, and political factors used 
by leaders to defend their respective nation-
states (Skinner, 2015). While tactics defines as 
to the art of fight and along with the use of 
various arms of the military-for example, 
armor, artillery, and infantry-on terrain and 
favorable position. In order to acknowledge the 
ideal-type strategies, the typology is explained 
as follows (Toft, 2001: 100): 
Attack (strong actor) strategies:  
(1) direct attack 
(2) barbarism 
 
Defense (weak actor) strategies: 
(3) direct defense 
(4) guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS) 
Based on the two distinct strategies, the 
approaches that are suitable in the strategic 
interaction classified into: direct and indirect. 
In direct approach, the focus is on targeting an 
adversary‟s armed forces in order to demolish 
the adversary‟s capacity to fight. While 
indirect approach seeks to demolish the 
adversary‟s will to fight: a guerilla warfare 
strategy target enemy soldiers, and barbarism 
targets enemy noncombatants (Toft, 2001: 
105). If the same approach (direct-direct or 
indirect-indirect) occurs in the conflict, the 
weak actor will be defeated because there is no 
deflection of strong actor‟s power advantage. 
While in contrast, if opposite approach apply 
in the interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-
direct), the victory for weak will indicate 
because the strong actor‟s power advantage is 
diverted or avoided (Toft, 2001: 105).  There 
are 4 (four) premises are as follows: 
First, in the context of direct attack versus 
direct defense, when strong actors attack 
using a direct strategy and weak actors 
defend using a direct strategy, all other 
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things being equal, strong actors should 
win quickly and decisively; 
 
Second, in the context of direct attack 
versus indirect defense, when strong actors 
attack with a direct strategy and weak 
actors defend using an indirect strategy, all 
other things being equal, weak actors 
should win;  
 
Third, in the context of indirect attack 
versus direct defense, when strong actors 
attack with an indirect strategy and weak 
actors defend using a direct strategy, all 
other things being equal, strong actors 
should lose; 
 
Fourth, in the context of indirect attack 
versus indirect defense, when strong actors 
employ barbarism to attack weak actors 
defending with a guerilla warfare strategy 
(GWS), all other things being equal, strong 
actor should win. 
It concludes these premises describe an 
interaction based on the same-approach or 
opposite-approach. With strong actors are 
more likely to win same-approach interactions 
and lose opposite-approach interactions. 
Russia is a regional strong actor versus 
Ukraine which perceived as a weak actor 
which conflicting interests in the protection of 
their national security. The clash of interest is 
affecting them to use its military power to 
pursuit their national interest. The writer 
identified that throughout strategic interaction 
occurring within the asymmetric conflict could 
be utilized in analyzing conditions of war that 
generate an outcome of states‟ actions in 
achieving their objectives. 
Conclusion 
The relative power of Russia as a 
strong actor in international system has 
determined its position to act assertively 
towards Ukraine. In regards to state behavior 
play a significance role in international system 
which reflected of Soviet Union era, Russia 
attempted to regain its sphere of influence over 
Ukraine-as. As result, a state implies power in 
victory. The behavior of Russia on this 
asymmetric warfare demonstrated Realist logic 
towards the protection of national security of 
the state. Realist logic becomes an integral part 
on Russia‟s military operation in Ukraine.  
It remains as center of gravity for 
Russia in building a Eurasian integration 
ambition. EU enlargement policy on Ukraine 
illustrates a small shift taken by Ukraine to 
increase its power from Western part of the 
contingent. Political and economic provisions 
are recognized to be the elements of both 
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entities‟ relations. Russia also still has several 
political measures to maintain. The importance 
of economic flow of energy transfer and 
natural resources, historic and symbolic 
(Crimea and Black Sea), military (defense 
industry and infrastructure of Russia Black Sea 
Fleet), and strategic geopolitical location are 
classified as the national interests of Russia 
over Ukraine. 
From national perspective, Russia 
reformulates country‟s foreign and defense 
policy in order to maintain its survival. 
Particularly under the timeframe on 2000 until 
2013, the revitalization process was become 
clearer on the stage. The willingness of Russia 
in return to change the world polarity 
architecture never is ignored. Russia renewed 
its foreign policy concept to maximizing 
presence on international system. Due to 
contemporary development, network 
diplomacy seems to be one of an effective 
solutions under these circumstances, including 
humanitarian and information technology. In 
addition, the reconstruction of Russian defense 
policy has strengthened state‟s capacity and 
capability in achieving the objectives. 
Additional consideration on Russia‟s military 
capability, the recognition of the advancement 
of cyber power, which begun since 2001 has 
signed a new dynamics of Russia‟s military 
operation. In the sense of combination between 
military and non-military forces, this new 
element is ready to be measured. 
In the interaction between the two 
countries, Russia confirms its status as strong 
actor. Russia determines its national security 
components based on national goals, national 
balance of power, and degree of national 
security. On national goals, Ukraine perceived 
as a zone of Russian interest. Ukraine is not 
allowed to have a direct align with the EU 
because geopolitically it might hamper 
Russia‟s Eurasian interests; Protection of 
Russian compatriots in Ukraine has become a 
legitimate instrument for Russia in expanding 
its influence; Russia‟s energy transfer to 
Europe must be secured; and the existence of 
Russia Black Sea Fleet have to be maintained.  
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